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Uninsured deposits represent a theoretically appealing but relatively untested alternative to subordinated 
debt for incorporating market discipline into banking supervision.  To make the deposit market a useful 
supervisory tool, it is necessary to know what types of risk are priced by depositors and in what 
proportions.  Using a clustering technique to select from among a large set of potential regressors, as well 
as a carefully chosen set of control variables, we attempt to determine the types of risk that cause 
uninsured depositors to react in both the price and quantity dimensions.  As a benchmark for economic 
significance, we estimate similar regressions on supervisory ratings.  We find that, in contrast to 
government supervisors, depositors have not priced most types of risk since 1997.  Indeed, the only risk 
variables that consistently come up as statistically significant are those that measure capital adequacy. 
Our interpretation of these results is that, because aggregate banking conditions are good, it is not worth 
depositors’ effort to investigate individual bank quality very carefully.  We conclude that, in the current 
economic and regulatory environment, the market is content to delegate most of its monitoring and 
discipline to the government.  To the extent that it does monitor, it only monitors capital.  The jumbo-CD 
market is thus not likely to be of much supervisory use, particularly given that examiners already have 
good information about capital levels.  The depositor emphasis on capital also supports the conjecture that 
market discipline was responsible for much of the recent capital build-up. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, both academics and regulators have recognized the need to give financial markets 
a larger role in bank supervision.  Although the mispricing of the safety net (Berger et al., 1995) and the 
macroeconomic externalities arising from bank lending (Bernanke, 1983) continue to justify the need for 
government constraints on bank risk, recent history points to serious problems with traditional 
supervisory policies.  The S&L debacle of the late 1980s, for example, demonstrated that agency 
problems in supervision can lead to lengthy delays in closing troubled institutions, delays that can cost 
taxpayers dearly (Kane, 1989; White, 1991).  The magnitude of these agency problems has led a number 
of prominent academics to call for greater reliance on market discipline (Benston, et. al, 1986; Calomiris, 
1997).  Meanwhile, despite the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA) and other reforms, the fast pace of change in banking continues to thwart supervisory attempts 
to monitor and constrain risk.  As fast as supervisors can design new exam procedures and capital charges 
for large banking organizations, the market renders them obsolete (Bank for International Settlements, 
1999).  As a result, an increasing number of high-level regulators have called for greater reliance on 
market feedback about the adequacy of risk controls (Greenspan, 1997; Meyer, 1999; and Stern, 1999). 
In theory, the market could contribute to supervision in one of three ways: (1) supervisors could 
delegate responsibility for constraining risk to the market for bank claims; (2) supervisors could use 
market signals about changes in risk to schedule and staff on-site examinations; or (3) supervisors could 
use market feedback to inform the design of examination procedures.  Banking economists and regulators 
around the developed world have now explored strategies for harnessing market pressure to contain bank 
risk.  The Basel capital accord counts market discipline as an explicit pillar of bank supervision—along 
with supervisory review and capital requirements.  In the United States, one popular proposal for 
enhancing market discipline involves requiring banks to issue a standardized form of subordinated debt 
(Board of Governors, 1999, 2000).  Indeed, the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (FMA) has taken 
tentative steps in this direction by requiring the certain large banking organizations to maintain sub-debt 
issues.  Advocates of this proposal argue, first, that high-powered performance incentives in the sub-debt 
market will lead to accurate assessments of bank risk.  And, second, these assessments (expressed for 
risky institutions in rising yields or difficulties rolling over maturing debt) will pressure bank managers to 
maintain safety and soundness (Lang and Robertson, 2002).  Of course, these are two different 
hypotheses—representing Bliss and Flannery’s (2001) distinction between monitoring and influence—
and the latter is both more suspect and more difficult to assess than the former.
1  Moreover, the thin 
secondary markets for claims of all but the largest banking institutions make the direct-pressure proposal 
unworkable for the vast majority of banks. 
Still, even if the subordinated-debt market—or any other market for bank claims—applies little 
direct pressure on bank managers, market-generated risk assessments could still contribute to supervisory 
review through off-site surveillance and exam emphasis. Off-site surveillance involves the use of 
accounting data and anecdotal evidence to schedule on-site examinations and to monitor bank progress in 
addressing previously identified deficiencies.  Supervisors can use signals from the prices of traded 
claims, accounting proxies for these prices, and information on changes in reliance on risk-priced funding 
to provide an early warning about increasing risk or to decide which types of specialists—liquidity-risk or 
market-risk specialists, for example—to send out with the regular examination team.  In the limit, 
supervisors could use market feedback to alter exam procedures.  For instance, examiners now look at 
capital protection, asset quality, management competence, earnings strength, liquidity risk, and market 
risk in on-site examinations.  Supervisors could use risk assessments from the market to add to or subtract 
from this list or to revise the weights placed on individual sources of risk when assessing overall bank 
condition. 
To date, discussions about harnessing sub-debt or other market signals for supervisory purposes 
have centered on large complex banking organizations because the supervisory benefits are thought to be 
                                                           
1 Bliss and Flannery (2001) looked for evidence that managers of bank holding companies respond to market 
pressure to contain risk.  They found none, though Rajan (2001) questioned the ability of their framework to unearth 
strong evidence of managerial responses.     3
the highest and the compliance costs lowest for these institutions (Emmons et al., 2001).  The benefits are 
perceived as the highest for large banks because of their complexity; these institutions engage in non-
bank activities frequently and use derivative instruments heavily.  Large banks also account for the lion’s 
share of U.S. banking assets, making the stability of the financial system dependent on their safety and 
soundness.  The compliance costs are thought to be the lowest because most of these institutions already 
tap national financial markets routinely.  For example, at year-end 2002, 41 of the 50 largest commercial 
banks, and 48 of the 50 largest bank holding companies, had subordinated debt outstanding. 
But before forcing all large banking organizations to issue subordinated debt in a standardized 
form, supervisors should make sure that existing securities do not produce useful risk signals.  A 
mandatory security issue is an implicit capital-structure tax.  We know of no evidence suggesting that the 
welfare loss from such a tax is negligible.  That most large banks currently issue sub-debt does not imply 
a negligible loss.  Voluntary issuance varies considerably over time with market conditions.  For example, 
issuance of subordinated debt by the top 50 banking organizations rose from less than 10 per year during 
1988-1990, to almost 86 per year during 1995-98, only to fall to 42 during 1999 (Covitz, et al., 2002).  At 
any given time, the banks with no outstanding sub debt may be just those institutions for which issuance 
is the most costly and risk signals the most valuable.  Moreover, those banks now issuing sub debt may 
not be choosing maturity structures likely to produce the most valuable supervisory signals, so even they 
would face an implicit tax.  The uncertain impact of a sub-debt tax—together with the lack of conclusive 
evidence of the tax’s supervisory value—suggest that supervisors should first try to extract useful signals 
about safety and soundness from claims banks already issue.
2 
The market for uninsured deposits provides a potentially rich source of information for designing, 
scheduling, and staffing on-site examinations because these deposits are already an important funding 
source for both large banks and community financial institutions.  At year-end 2002, banks holding more 
than $500 million in assets (1999 dollars) funded an average of 12.8% of their assets with jumbo CDs.  
For banks holding less than $500 million in assets—the regulatory asset cutoff for a community financial 
institution under FMA—the ratio was 11.9%.  Jumbo CDs have also become an even more important part 
of bank capital structure in recent years.  The ratios just mentioned are up from a low of 7.2% (average 
for all banks) at year-end 1993.  As with subordinated debt, the structure of payoffs to holders of large 
CDs and bank supervisors is similar.  Uninsured depositors should care only about expected losses from 
default because returns in non-default states accrue to equity holders.  Similarly, supervisors derive few 
benefits from bank performance in non-default states but are held accountable for failures because of the 
costs to the deposit insurance fund.  Given the similarity in payoff structures, jumbo-CD holders and bank 
supervisors should be “pricing” the same risk factors.  Hence, in theory, bank supervisors could use 
feedback from the jumbo-CD market to inform the exam process.  Before doing so, however, it is 
necessary (1) to confirm that yields on or quantity flows of uninsured deposits do indeed reflect bank risk 
and (2) to determine the weights that uninsured depositors place on individual sources of bank risk. 
Although some recent work has addressed the former question, little has been done to explore the 
latter.  Previous research comparing accounting data on jumbo CDs to bank risk has found some 
statistical significance but little in the way of economic significance or reliable magnitudes.  However, 
most recent research along these lines has used a single summary measure of bank risk that could be 
masking stronger relationships between CD premia and specific types of bank risk.  Indeed, such 
relationships have been found in publicly traded subordinated debt in recent studies by Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996) and Jagtiani et al. (1999).
3 
                                                           
2 Available evidence suggests that holders of bank-issued subordinated-debt do price default risk.  Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996), for example, document increases in the risk sensitivity of sub-debt yields as the U.S. government 
retreated from “too-big-to-fail” guarantees.  This evidence does not, however, imply that sub-debt signals have 
significant supervisory value.  Bliss (2001) argues that the poor microstructure of the sub-debt market renders the 
risk signals from default spreads unreliable.  Evanoff and Wall (2001) provide supporting evidence—finding that 
sub-debt yields barely outperform regulatory capital ratios—themselves poor proxies for overall supervisory 
assessments—as predictors of financial distress.  
3 Krainer and Lopez (forthcoming) and Hall et al. (2003) have recently performed similar analyses on equity-market 
data.   4
These studies and other recent research on liability-market discipline are listed in Table 1.  (For a 
more extensive summary, see Flannery, 1998.)  Although the literature generally confirms the presence of 
market discipline, note that little work has been done on data subsequent to FDICIA, which may have had 
a significant effect on liability-holders’ incentives to monitor risk.  Even among this small group of 
studies, only our (2002) paper looks at a large sample of bank deposits and examines both the yield and 
runoff dimensions.
4  Prior to that, one must look back to Park and Peristiani (1998) or Park (1995) to find 
similar attempts, the data for which papers are now 15 years and several legislative changes behind us.  
Our prior paper used a summary index measure of bank risk, making it impossible to determine the 
specific types of risk responsible for the statistically significant but economically small discipline we 
found in the post-FDICIA period.  Similarly, Gilbert et al. (2002) found that jumbo-CD yields had little 
potential to contribute to a comprehensive early-warning model of banking distress, but they did not 
examine the possibility that yields might provide useful signals about certain categories of risk.  However, 
in order to rule out the CD market as a source of surveillance information, one must make the case that it 
cannot add marginal information to any aspect of the supervisory process, and this requires a 
decomposition of bank risk into its various components. 
To explore the ways in which information about uninsured deposits may be useful in supervision, 
we measure the importance that holders of large time deposits place on individual sources of bank risk 
and then compare these market assessments with concurrent supervisory assessments.  Specifically, using 
a panel dataset with approximately 70,000 quarterly observations between 1997 and 2003, we regress 
jumbo-CD yields on measures of credit risk, liquidity, capital protection, and other aspects of bank 
performance.  These variables are chosen from a large set of initial candidates using a variable-clustering 
procedure, and we also compare an alternative set of regressors based on previously developed early-
warning models.  We control for bank-specific effects such as market access and for other factors that 
affect CD yields, such as maturity and the level of interest rates, and include dummy variables to control 
for macroeconomic events and bank location.  A regression of composite supervisory (CAMELS) ratings 
on the same set of explanatory variables allows us to demonstrate that our variables do indeed represent 
risk factors and to achieve a benchmark for economic significance. 
Our evidence informs the market discipline debate in several ways.  First, using six years of 
recent data, we show that, generally speaking, uninsured depositors pay little attention to risk in any form. 
This result, which is consistent with other recent research, implies that information from this market 
cannot play a substantial role in supervision.  However, uninsured depositors do seem to react to one 
variable, namely capital.  Although this finding suggests that deposit markets may be capable of policing 
capital levels, this attribute is not especially helpful to supervisors, because capital adequacy is among the 
most straightforward aspects of a bank’s condition to assess.  (Indeed, this is likely one reason that the 
deposit market bothers with this type of risk and no other.)  The depositor emphasis on capital also 
supports Flannery and Rangan’s (2002) hypothesis that market discipline was responsible for much of the 
capital build-up in the late 1990s. 
Our interpretation of these results is that, because aggregate banking conditions are good, it is not 
worth depositors’ effort to investigate individual bank quality very carefully.  Capital is worth 
investigating because it can be observed at low cost and is arguably the single best indicator of whether a 
liability-holder is going to see his funds repaid.  Otherwise, we conclude that, given the healthy overall 






  We regress measures of both jumbo-CD-market and supervisory assessments of risk on an 
identical vector of risk and control variables. This empirical framework is similar to the one we use in 
                                                           
4 Although they did not explicitly test depositor responses to bank risk, Gilbert and Vaughan (2001) found that 
jumbo-CD holders did not respond, through either yields or runoffs, to supervisory enforcement actions in the early 
1990s.   5
Hall et al. (2003), which in turn was inspired by the approach used by Saunders, Strock, and Travlos 
(1990).  By comparing the economic and statistical significance of the risk coefficients between the 
supervisory and market equations, we hope to determine whether supervisors and uninsured depositors 
emphasize the same factors.  In choosing our vector of risk variables, we begin with a large set of ratios 
based on bank-level data and use a hierarchical variable-clustering procedure to select a set of variables 
that capture as much as possible of the variation in the data while minimizing any multicollinearity.  This 
step is important because we want to examine the relative statistical significance of our variables, and 
multicollinearity could interfere with this objective. 
Our data cover 24 quarters (1997:2 through 2003:1) and include the majority of banks in each 
quarter.
5  The sample period spans a business cycle but is otherwise notable mainly for its lack of 
intitutional and regulatory change, relative to the years immediately preceding it.  (The primary exception 
to this statement is FMA, although this legislation has arguably had little effect on the majority of banks 
so far.)  We screen out banks recently involved in mergers and impose a few restrictions to eliminate 
outliers and other sources of noise.  Most importantly, we include only observations on banks that 
averaged at least $5 million in outstanding jumbo CDs over the quarter, in an attempt to avoid low-base 
distortions. 
To construct the initial set of candidate risk variables, we draw on three strands of literature: 
previous studies of jumbo-CD yields (Baer and Brewer, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Ellis and 
Flannery, 1992; James, 1988; Cargill, 1989; James, 1990; Keeley, 1990; Cook and Spellman, 1994; 
Brewer and Mondschean, 1994; Park, 1995; and Park and Peristiani, 1998), previous studies of market 
discipline by other uninsured debtholders (Avery et al., 1988; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; and Jagtiani et 
al., 1999) and recent studies of the factors responsible for bank failures and CAMEL downgrades (Cole et 
al., 1995; and Gilbert et al., 1999).  The set contains 47 variables, many of which are also ratios 
commonly used in on- and off-site supervision.  Together, they reflect a broad array of risk and 
operational characteristics, including asset quality, liquidity, capital, balance-sheet composition, operating 
efficiency, profitability, and off-balance-sheet activity. 
  The initial set of 47 variables, as well as the outcome of the clustering procedure, is depicted in 
Figure 1.   The variables grouped in the same cluster are all highly correlated with one another and only 
weakly correlated with the variables in the other clusters.  The tree structure represents the sequence in 
which the clusters break apart, depending on how many clusters we allow.  Although any number of 
clusters from one to 47 is technically possible here, we decided, after some experimenting, that eight 
clusters permitted an appropriate balance of differentiation among the regressors, while still maintaining 
parsimony.  For use in the regressions, we selected a variable from each cluster based on its correlation 
with the other variables in and out of its own cluster and on the frequency with which it is used by 
supervisors and in previous academic studies.  The eight risk variables we ultimately selected, together 
with their summary statistics, are reported in Table 2. 
  The first variable is the net noninterest margin.  This ratio, defined as noninterest expense less 
noninterest income over total assets, represents, in part, the operating costs and efficiency of a bank.  As 
can be seen in Figure 1, it is correlated with a number of ratios reflecting the basic composition of the 
bank and, in particular, liability mix.  The second variable is delinquent loans (i.e., those 30 to 89 days 
past due) divided by total assets.  Of all the variables, this one proxies most closely for asset quality.  Also 
in its cluster are several variables relating to loan mix, which, of course, is also highly correlated with 
asset quality.  Next is the ratio of equity to assets.  This is probably the most common measure of capital 
adequacy.  The other variables in its cluster reflect a hodge-podge of asset-quality and liquidity concerns.  
The fourth variable is the ratio of commercial-real-estate (CRE) lending to total loans, a forward-looking 
measure of asset quality.  CRE loans suffer among the highest loss rates historically, particularly during 
recessions.  The other variables in this cluster primarily reflect the breakdown of the real-estate portfolio.  
Fifth, we have return on average assets (ROA), a common measure of profitability.  Other measures of 
                                                           
5 All bank-level data used in this paper come from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (call reports) 
filed quarterly by every commercial bank with its regulator.  We do not extend the sample prior to 1997 because of 
changes in the structure of the call report that made the computation of consistent series impossible for certain 
variables.   6
earnings are also in this cluster, as are some backward-looking asset quality ratios—perhaps because 
nonperforming loans are likely to affect earnings by becoming losses in the near future.  The sixth 
variable is the log of total assets.  Bank size is correlated with many other factors, and may be viewed by 
both markets and supervisors as a proxy for other types of risk.  As can be seen from its clustering 
behavior, it is most directly correlated with certain loan categories.  Seventh, the loan-to-core-deposit 
ratio is a traditional liquidity measure.  The only other variable in this cluster, the ratio of risk-priced to 
non-risk-priced funding, is also a proxy for liquidity.  Finally, the ratio of nonaccruing loans to total 
assets is another measure of asset quality.  Many of the variables in its cluster, however, also appear to 
reflect liquidity issues. 
Because variable selection always requires some judgment and is thus always subject to suspicion 
and disagreement, we also test a set of variables more widely accepted as reflecting important aspects of 
bank risk.  Specifically, we use the vector of eleven risk variables included in the Fed’s official early 
warning model, the System to Estimate Examination Ratings (SEER), which is described in Cole et al. 
(1995).  The SEER model uses a logistic regression to produce an objective assessment of overall bank 
condition with financial ratios that have signaled impending problems in the past.  The financial ratios in 
the model include proxies for credit risk, liquidity risk, and leverage risk, along with a control variable for 
bank size.  Extensive in- and out-of-sample validation tests were performed on the SEER model during 
development in the early 1990s.  SEER is also validated annually by the surveillance section at the Board 
of Governors.  Finally, recent research has validated the model in out-of-sample performance tests against 
other surveillance tools (Gilbert et al., 2002).  Summary statistics on the SEER variables are also reported 
in Table 2.  Note that there is a good deal of overlap between the two sets of regressors.  This is no doubt 
due to the fact that both were selected to achieve comprehensive yet parsimonious representations of bank 
risk. 
Because tests of the statistical significance and economic importance of the failure-risk 
coefficients are central to our work, we conduct an extensive search for appropriate control variables, 
drawing heavily on our work with jumbo CDs in Hall et al. (2002).  We opt for this approach rather than a 
fixed-effects model because most of the sample variation is between banks, and fixed effects would 
sweep out much of this variation.  Our selection of controls was based on examiner suggestions, previous 
jumbo-CD research, and related market-discipline studies.  The control vector comprises proxies for the 
yield on Treasuries with maturities matching the issuing bank’s jumbo-CD maturities, the average 
maturity of the issuing bank’s jumbo-CD portfolio, the negotiability of the issuing bank’s jumbo CDs, the 
market power of the issuing bank, and the funding demands of the issuing bank.  The specification also 
includes a maturity-weighted-Treasury/average-portfolio-maturity interaction term along with state, 
quarter, and charter-type dummies.  
We use the maturity-weighted risk-free rate for each bank to control for term premia as well as 
for the general level of interest rates.  We obtain this measure by multiplying the proportion of each 
bank’s CDs in each call-report maturity bucket—“less than three months remaining,” “three months to 
one year remaining,” “one year to three years remaining,” and “over three years remaining”—by the yield 
on comparable-maturity Treasuries in the same quarter.  As a further control for term-structure and 
liquidity effects, we include the average jumbo-CD maturity for each sample bank.  We also add an 
interactive variable equal to the product of the two-quarter lag of each bank’s average jumbo-CD maturity 
and the most recent two-quarter change in the maturity-adjusted risk-free rate.  Because yields equal total 
quarterly interest expense divided by average balances, they conflate rates paid on seasoned CDs with 
rates paid on fresh issues.  As a result, average yields for banks with shorter average CD maturities adjust 
faster to changes in market rates—and failure probability—than average yields at banks with longer CD 
maturities.  As a final control for liquidity, we include a control for jumbo-CD negotiability.  The call 
report does not note whether a CD is negotiable, so we rely on a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer 
has over $10 billion in real assets (in 1999 dollars).  We use this dummy because only large, money-
center banks routinely issue instruments that trade in a secondary market. 
Because power in the local deposit market could enable a bank to pay less than the going jumbo-
CD rate (Berger and Hannan, 1989), we include a dummy equaling one for banks in a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) on the premise that urban banks face more competition.  To control for funding 
demand, we include a dummy equal to one if the sample bank uses brokered deposits.  Some banks can   7
satisfy loan demand with locally obtained jumbo CDs, and the yields and runoffs for these CDs may show 
little sensitivity to money-market conditions or failure risk because of retail adjustment costs (Flannery, 
1982).  Going to the national market for funding means paying the going risk-adjusted rate.  Brokered 
deposits are blocks of deposits just under the $100,000 insurance ceiling that move around the country in 
search of the highest yield.  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (1989) 
restricted the use of brokered deposits by weakly capitalized institutions, and examiners frown on them 
even in healthy banks.  Thus, the presence of brokered deposits in the capital structure is strong evidence 
that a bank’s funding needs exceed local supply.  
We round out the control vector with state, quarterly, and charter-type time dummies.  The state 
dummies are included to pick up differences in regional economic conditions, state banking laws, and 
state income-tax laws.  We use state-level dummies to control for differences in the regional economic 
environment because bank conditions in the 1990s were not correlated with county-level economic data 
(Meyer and Yeager, 2001).  State-level controls could also pick up differences in banking concentration 
not captured by the MSA dummy.  The quarterly time dummies control for seasonal fluctuations in 
deposit and money-market conditions and for business-cycle fluctuations inside of each sample window.  
The quarterly dummies also control for any differences in the perceived condition of the deposit-
insurance fund over time.
6  Finally, the charter-type dummies account primarily for potential differences 
in emphasis and enforcement between regulatory agencies.  Because different regulators are subject to 
different political pressures and constraints, it is reasonable to believe that they might differ in their 
supervisory procedures, and this could have differential effects on the performance of their supervised 
institutions (Berger et al., 2001). 
As dependent variables, we use both yields on and growth of large time deposits and composite 
CAMELS scores assigned by supervisors.  The yields are computed as total annualized interest expense 
divided by the quarterly average of large time deposits outstanding.  Obviously, we would prefer to use 
secondary-market data rather than accounting constructions to measure yields.  Unfortunately, only a 
handful of large banks issue jumbo CDs that are actively traded in secondary markets, so real-time, 
market-generated yields are not available for most institutions (Morris and Walter, 1993).  It is possible, 
however, to use quarterly financial data to construct average jumbo-CD yields for almost every bank in 
the country.  Indeed, the wide availability of these data are their primary appeal from a supervisory 
standpoint—secondary-market data can never be a useful surveillance tool for any banks but the few that 
are large enough to issue liquid, heavily-traded securities.  Other researchers have successfully used 
similar accounting-data-based approaches to test hypotheses about bank risk (for example, James, 1988; 
Keeley 1990; and, more recently, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  Still, proxies based on these 
yields suffer from two related types of measurement error.  First, they are average rather than marginal 
measures and, therefore, somewhat backward looking.  Second, they are quarterly accounting measures 
rather than real-time economic measures.   
Measurement-error problems do not, by themselves, imply that accounting-based jumbo-CD 
signals are valueless in off-site surveillance.  Jumbo-CD runoff—a quantity response to changes in bank 
risk—can be measured relatively error-free with accounting data.  Moreover, financial-distress models 
based on accounting data have been a cornerstone of regulatory and private-sector surveillance for 
decades (Altman and Saunders, 1997).  For example, these models often give heavy weight to book-value 
measures of credit risk and capital protection, both of which are known to suffer from serious 
measurement error (Barth et al., 1996).  Finally, and most importantly, the supervisory value of jumbo-
CD signals—or any market signal for that matter—depends not on the power of the signal alone, but 
rather on the power of the signal adjusted for the cost of extracting it.  Thus, the value of jumbo-CD data 
in bank surveillance is ultimately an empirical issue.  
The growth rates we use as our other dependent variable are simply the annualized quarterly 
changes in large time deposits.  Park and Peristiani (1998) note that yields completely summarize default 
                                                           
6 Cook and Spellman (1994) argue that insured funds carry risk premiums because the FDIC sometimes lacks 
resources to indemnify depositors.  With time dummies, they find that risk premiums on insured deposits vary with 
the condition of the deposit-insurance fund.  With a different sample and a different empirical strategy, Cooperman 
et al. (1992) also find evidence of risk premiums on insured deposits.   8
risk only when the jumbo-CD market is frictionless.  When transaction or information frictions are 
present, jumbo-CD holders may choose to withdraw their funds from high-risk institutions.  In addition, 
Jordan (2000) and Billett et al. (1998) have documented a tendency for risky banking organizations to 
substitute insured for uninsured deposits to escape higher default premiums.  If such substitution effects 
are important, then signals about changing risk exposures may show up in jumbo-CD runoffs rather than 
default premiums. 
As our measure of supervisory assessment, we employ composite CAMELS scores, which are 
ratings assigned by examiners at the conclusion of each onsite examination.  (Because not every bank is 
examined in every quarter, there are fewer observations for these regressions than for the jumbo-CD 
regressions.)  The scores range from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) and reflect six explicit components: capital 
adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity, (L), and 
market sensitivity (S).  Although examiners also rate each of these components on a 1-to-5 scale, the 
composite score is not a formal aggregation of the components.  Rather, it reflects the examiners’ 
assessment of the overall safety and soundness of the institution. 
  We estimate OLS regressions for each of the three dependent variables using the vectors of risk 
proxies and controls described above.  It is then possible to compare statistical significance by comparing 
the t statistics across the market and supervisory equations.  We also compare economic significance by 
looking at the standardized coefficients in each regression.  Because CAMELS scores take discrete 
values, we also estimate logistic regressions for the supervisor equations.  However, although this is the 
more appropriate specification, it is difficult to compare its coefficients directly to those in the OLS 
regressions estimated for the jumbo-CD market.  We therefore report it mainly to demonstrate that the 





We report the results of the regressions in Tables 3 through 5.  Table 3 shows the response of 
jumbo-CD yields to the regressors.  These regressions fit the data well, with R
2s of 0.60 in both cases, 
although, of course, much of the explanatory power comes simply from the Treasury yield variable.   
Among the variables selected through our clustering procedure, only three variables are statistically 
significant at the 10% level: the commercial-real-estate ratio, the equity ratio, and the loan-to-core-deposit 
ratio.  The loan-to-core ratio has the opposite sign of what theory predicts (higher values indicate less 
liquidity), perhaps because uninsured depositors view higher levels of core deposits as senior claims that 
could eat into their recoveries in the event of default.  In any case, only the equity ratio is statistically 
significant at the 1% level with the expected sign.  In the specification using the SEER variables, only the 
ratio of tangible net worth to total assets is significant at the 1% level, and it has the expected negative 
sign.  This ratio is very similar to the equity-to-assets ratio that is used in the first specification.  The ratio 
of jumbo CDs to total assets is significant at the 10% level and has a negative sign, but this result almost 
certainly reflects some endogeneity.  It is also comforting to note that, in both specifications, the control 
variables are almost all strongly significant with the theoretically correct signs.  (The only puzzle that 
stands out is that banks in MSAs appear to pay less on their jumbo CDs, in contrast to what the greater 
competition would seem to demand.)  The regressions attempting to explain jumbo-CD runoff are even 
less successful, achieving R
2s of just 0.02.  Although some of the control and dummy variables display 
moderately high t values, none of the risk variables in either specification achieves even a 10% level of 
significance. 
In the OLS regressions with CAMELS composite scores as the dependent variable, by contrast, 
almost every risk variable in both the cluster-selected and SEER sets is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and has the anticipated sign.  (The one exception is the net non-interest margin, which is statistically 
insignificant.)  The R
2s of these regressions are about 0.36, but the mediocre fit is due in part to the 
misspecification of the discrete response as a linear function.  When we run the logit models, similar 
significance patterns obtain (with the exceptions that the residential-real-estate ratio is no longer 
significant at the 1% level but the net non-interest margin becomes significant). Few of the control 
variables have much explanatory power for CAMELS scores in either the OLS or logit specifications,   9
which is not surprising because they were largely selected to account for deposit-market factors.  In terms 
of statistical significance, it appears that ROA and the non-accruing-loan ratio are the most important 
variables to examiners, with equity also contributing substantially.  This finding is intuitive, as earnings, 
asset quality, and capital are explicit components of the CAMELS framework, and the above-mentioned 
variables are common measures of these types of risk. 
Statistical significance, of course, does not necessarily imply economic significance, so it is 
important to gauge the size of the impact that each statistically significant risk factor had on CD yields 
and CAMELS scores.  To measure the economic importance of each risk factor to jumbo-CD holders and 
supervisors, we compute the elasticities of the dependent variables with respect to the independent 
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where βi,j is the coefficient estimate of the independent variable Xi in the Yj regression, and the σ’s 
represent the standard deviations of the subscripted variables.  Because of their nonlinear character, the 
logit specifications do not readily allow for this computation.  Indeed, the ability to make this comparison 
is the primary reason for running the OLS model on the CAMELS scores in addition to the logit.   
Standardized coefficients for the risk proxies obtained from the full sample appear in the right-hand 
columns of Tables 3 through 5. 
As with statistical significance, the results in the supervisory equations are much stronger than 
those in the market equations.  The magnitude of the standardized coefficients when the CAMELS score 
is the dependent variable ranges from 0.02 to 0.30.  None of the risk variables in the market equations 
achieves even the lower bound of this range.  The equity ratio has the highest economic significance in 
the yield equations, at about 0.009.  To get a sense for what this magnitude means, notice that the (raw) 
coefficient of -0.003 implies less than a 1-basis-point increase in funding cost for every percentage-point 
drop in capital.  In terms of overall profitability, this response would appear to be insufficient to suppress 
any risk appetites on the part of management.  Indeed, if we take the standardized coefficients in the 
CAMLES equation to be a benchmark for economic significance, then we must conclude that market 
discipline in the jumbo-CD market is weak across the board.  Although depositors do appear to respond to 
capital adequacy, the degree of their response is an order of magnitude lower than the response of 
supervisors. 
Although we have tried to be as agnostic and scientific as possible in selecting our reported 
specification, these basic results stand up to a variety of alternative choices for the independent-variable 
vector.  Whatever combination of variables one includes as regressors, the only one that is consistently 
strongly significant is the measure of capital.  This result does not appear to be driven by large banks—as 
many findings of market-discipline are.  Indeed, splitting the sample at $500 million (not reported) shows 
a stronger response of capital at the small banks than at the large banks.  We conclude that there is a 
robust, but economically weak, pricing response of jumbo-CD holders to capital ratios.  No other type of 
risk appears to be priced consistently, and no growth-rate (runoff) response of any kind is apparent. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In recent years, many academics and policy-makers have called for greater reliance on market 
discipline in bank supervision.  An important step towards greater reliance on such discipline is gaining 
insight into the weights placed on different sources of risk by uninsured depositors and bank supervisors.  
Jumbo-CD holders and bank supervisors face similar payoff structures (negative return in default states; 
no return in non-default states), so they should place similar weights on individual sources of risk.   
Because the market should theoretically be more agile than the government in responding to changes in   10
risk, the theory indicates that supervisors may be able to rely on depositor behavior for signals about 
changes in bank condition.  Based on the types of risk priced by depositors, these signals could contribute 
to decisions about the timing, staffing, and focus of on-site examinations. 
To identify empirically the risk factors priced by uninsured depositors, we selected a vector of 
bank condition and income variables through a clustering procedure and then tested whether these 
variables had significant explanatory power for jumbo-CD yields and growth rates.  For robustness, we 
also used a vector of variables independently selected from the Fed’s SEER model.  As a benchmark, we 
tested the same risk vectors against supervisory CAMELS scores.  To assess the importance of each 
variable in each equation, we looked at both statistical significance and economic significance, as 
measured by standardized coefficients.  The sample included pooled quarterly data from 1997:2 through 
2003:1, covering nearly 5,000 banks of varying size. 
We found that, although supervisors emphasize all types of risk factors (focusing most heavily on 
earnings, asset quality, and capital), the jumbo-CD market takes little notice of risk in general.  This result 
is consistent with some earlier work uncovering only weak evidence for market discipline among large 
depositors.  The main thing that is new about the current paper—apart from the more recent sample 
period—is that we decompose risk into its various aspects to see if the pricing of any particular category 
lurks beneath the surface of these puny composite coefficients.  We find strong evidence for the pricing of 
only one type of risk, that pertaining to capital levels.  Although there is weak evidence here and there for 
price responses to other factors, capital is the only variable that consistently achieves a 1% level of 
statistical significance, and it also commands the highest level of economic significance (although this 
level is still much lower than the responses of regulators).  Furthermore, all of our results occur in the 
yield equations: we find no evidence at all that depositors respond through runoff. 
Constructing market “prices” from accounting data is always a dicey proposition, particularly 
when some of these data—such as interest expense—partially reflect bank and market conditions from the 
continuum of previous quarters over which the instruments were originally issued.  The reader would thus 
be justified in suspecting that measurement error might be responsible for the absence of statistical 
significance of our risk variables in the market equations.  However, our previous investigations into this 
issue (described at length in Hall et al., 2002) suggest that, as long as maturity structure and other factors 
are properly dealt with, the measurement error problems are, in fact, minimal.  Moreover, the finding that 
the signs and significance patterns on the control variables are almost exactly what we expect implies that 
the left-hand-side variable is measured well enough to conform to our ideas about what a yield should 
behave like.  Finally, the growth rates of the jumbo-CD portfolios are measured without error.  Even if 
one believes that the lack of statistical significance in the pricing equation is due to measurement error, 
one would still be forced to conclude that quantity responses to risk are negligible among large 
depositors. 
Frictions could explain the weak discipline imposed on risky banks by the jumbo-CD market.  
Jumbo-CD rates may “cluster” around integers and even fractions (Kahn et al., 1999); such clustering 
would make rates less responsive to changes in bank risk.  Similarly, jumbo-CD holders may also receive 
other services—commercial loans and checking services, for example—from their bank and, thus, price 
the relationship comprehensively rather than CDs individually.  A final possibility is that jumbo-CD 
holders are simply noise traders, giving little thought to failure-risk when deciding where to place their 
funds.  
However, market frictions are likely not the sole cause of weak discipline in the jumbo-CD 
market; the long business-cycle expansion of the 1990s probably also plays a role.  Over this period, bank 
profitability, capital, and coverage ratios (i.e., loan loss reserves to problem loans) soared to record highs 
while failure rates plummeted to record lows.  Even during the recent recession, banking conditions have 
been remarkably resilient.  Indeed, during our sample period, the failure rate for U.S. commercial banks 
was less than one-tenth of one percent per year, and nearly all of the failures were resolved through 
purchase and assumption, leaving many uninsured depositors fully compensated.  In such an 
environment, jumbo-CD holders have little incentive to engage in costly monitoring, and yields and 
runoff rates are unlikely to react strongly to failure risk.  The incentive is weakened even further by the 
knowledge that government supervisors are already performing this monitoring.  In other words, the 
market appears to delegate much of its monitoring and disciplining functions to the government.  This   11
story is consistent with the successful use of average yields in bank-risk studies a decade ago, a time 
when financial distress was fairly common, failures were sharply rising, the supervisory infrastructure 
was faltering, and depositors consequently had a stronger incentive to pay attention to the condition of 
their banks. 
If only one aspect of risk is to be reflected in jumbo-CD yields, it makes sense that it should be 
capital adequacy.  After all, capital is the uninsured depositor’s primary protection against default, and it 
can be assessed with a few simple ratios at low cost.  Flannery and Rangan (2002) have argued that 
financial markets are indirectly responsible for the capital buildup among large complex banking 
organizations in the 1990s, i.e., that bank stakeholders have insisted on a greater capital cushion because 
of the increasing sophistication of risk exposures.  Our evidence is consistent with this view.   
Unfortunately, signals about capital levels are perhaps the least helpful type for off-site surveillance 
purposes.  Capital levels are easy for supervisors to observe as well, and they typically do not change 
quickly, making market-based early-warning signals about them—even when such signals are reliable—
somewhat superfluous.  If the market communicated information about, say, changes in interest-rate risk 
or liquidity, both of which can change a great deal between exams or even call report dates without much 
obvious outward sign, its marginal contribution to the supervisory process could be positive.  But our 
evidence suggests that CD-market signals do not contain information about such risks. 
Thus, the evidence presented here weakens the case for market discipline as a pillar of bank 
supervision.  The price of risk in the jumbo-CD market appears to be so small that even bank managers 
devoted to maximizing shareholder value will not be deterred from risk taking.  Moreover, it does not 
appear to be possible for supervisors to extract a meaningful signal about bank risk by observing the 
behavior of uninsured depositors, especially if one believes our argument that depositors are relying on 
supervisors to do their monitoring for them.  Now, it is true that all of the concrete proposals for 
operationalizing market discipline as a supervisory pillar have concentrated on subordinated debt rather 
than jumbo CDs.  (For example, see Lang and Robertson, 2002; Evanoff and Wall, 2000; and Calomiris, 
1997.)  Still, forcing banking organizations to issue subordinated debt in a standardized form is an 
implicit capital-structure tax.  Before imposing such a tax, policymakers should adduce evidence that 
subordinated debt will produce the desired discipline.  For most banks, jumbo CDs are a relatively junior 
liability—like subordinated debt at large banking organizations—and the jumbo-CD market’s weak 
reaction to risk suggests that subordinated debt may not produce an effective check on risk. 
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Table 1 
Selected Market-Discipline Studies Since 1990  
This table summarizes prior research on risk pricing by depository-institution liability holders.  (We use the term 
“bank” to refer to bank holding companies as well as banks.  We use the term “risk pricing” to mean a price or 
quantity response to a change in bank risk.)  These studies employ both cross-section and time-series techniques and 
use a variety of risk proxies and control variables.  Overall, the evidence suggests that liability holders price bank 
risk.  Most of this research, however, relies on samples that pre-date the 1990s regulatory changes.  A few recent 
studies that examine information from the equity and federal-funds markets are not included in the table. 
Study  Sample 
Period   Instrument   Number of 
Institutions 
Yield or 
Runoff?  Discipline? 
Gorton and Santomero (1990)  1983 – 84  Bank Sub 
Debt  XX Yield No 
Keeley (1990)  1971 – 86  Bank  
Jumbo CDs  85 Yield  Yes 
Ellis and Flannery (1992)  1982 – 88  Bank 
 Jumbo CDs  6 Yield  Yes 
Cook and Spellman (1994)  1987 – 88  Thrift  
Jumbo CDs  ~200 Yield Yes 
Crabbe and Post (1994)  1986 – 91  Bank  
Jumbo CDs  41 Runoff  No 
Brewer and Mondschean (1994)  1987 – 89  Thrift 
 Jumbo CDs  4 Yield  Yes 
Park (1995)  1985 – 92  Bank  
Jumbo CDs  ~10,000 Both  Yes 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996)  1983 – 91  Bank Sub 
Debt  XX Yield  Yes 
Park and Peristiani (1998)  1986 – 90  Thrift  
Jumbo CDs   ~3,000 Both  Yes 
Jagtiani et al. (1999)  1992 – 97  Bank Sub 
Debt  XX Yield  Yes 
Jordan (2000)  1989 – 95  Bank  
Jumbo CDs   65 Both  Yes 
Evanoff and Wall (2001)  1985 – 99  Bank Sub 
Debt  100 Yield  Weak 
Goldberg and Hudgins (2002)  1984 – 94  Thrift  
jumbo CDs  619 Runoff  Yes 
Hall et al. (2002)  1988 – 95  Bank  
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Net noninterest margin  2.28% 0.99%  -19.17%  36.82% 
Loans 30-89 days past due / assets  0.97% 0.91%  0.00%  15.78% 
Equity / assets  10.42% 3.93%  0.04%  80.25% 
CRE / loans  27.85% 15.11% 0.00%  99.00% 
ROA  1.16% 0.80%  -21.74%  13.33% 
Log of total assets  11.34 1.26  6.89  19.37 

































Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.44% 0.71%  0.00%  17.77% 
ROA  1.16% 0.80%  -21.74%  13.33% 
Commercial & industrial loans / assets  9.60% 6.94%  0.00%  80.32% 
Residential RE loans / assets  17.48% 11.16% 0.00%  83.46% 
Jumbo CDs / assets  11.29% 6.83%  0.00%  77.24% 
Tangible net worth / assets  10.19% 3.85%  0.04%  80.25% 
Loans 90+ days past due / assets  0.24% 0.47%  0.00%  13.30% 
Loans 30-89 days past due / assets  0.97% 0.91%  0.00%  15.78% 
Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.44% 0.71%  0.00%  17.77% 
Securities / assets  27.15% 14.00% 0.00%  97.61% 





















Log of total assets  11.34 1.26  6.89  19.37 
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  4.09%  1.68% 1.18% 6.51% 
Large time deposit maturity (months)  9.69 4.81  1.50  58.60 
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -3.30% 7.71%  -136.23%  68.76% 
Over $10 bil dummy  0.01  0.09 0.00 1.00 
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.18  0.39 0.00 1.00 
State-member-bank dummy  0.11  0.31 0.00 1.00 



















MSA dummy  0.50  0.50 0.00 1.00 
Large time deposit yield  4.96% 1.28%  0.02%  24.63% 












CAMELS composite rating  1.68 0.67  1  5 
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Table 3.  Regression Results: Deposit Yields 
 
A.  Cluster-Selected Variables 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 
  Standardized 
Coefficient 
Net noninterest margin  -0.0033 
(-0.840) 
 -0.0025 
Delinquent loans / assets  0.0014 
(0.410) 
 0.0010 
Equity / assets  -0.0033 
(-4.120) 
*** -0.0102 
CRE / loans  0.0004 
(1.760) 
* 0.0047 
ROA  -0.0057 
(-1.230) 
 -0.0035 
Log of total assets  0.0027 
(0.800) 
 0.0026 


















Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.0034 
(0.760) 
 0.0019 



















































2  0.630 
Adjusted R
2  0.630 
Observations  68,809 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions of jumbo-CD yields on the above variables, selected 
through variable clustering, plus time and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***) levels.   18
Table 3 (continued).  Regression Results: Deposit Yields 
 
B. SEER Variables 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 
  Standardized 
Coefficient 
ROA  -0.0040 
(-0.990)
  -0.0025
C&I Loans / assets  0.0001 
(0.150)
  0.0004
Residential RE Loans / assets  -0.0002 
(-0.440)
  -0.0014
Jumbo CDs / assets  -0.0010 
(-1.950)
**  -0.0051
Tangible net worth / assets  -0.0031 
(-3.500)
***  -0.0093
Loans 90+ days past due / assets  -0.0051 
(-0.740)
  -0.0019
Loans 30-89 days past due / assets  0.0018 
(0.490)
  0.0013
Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.0052 
(1.140)
  0.0029
Securities / assets  0.00004 
(-0.140)
  -0.0004


















Log of total assets  0.0030 
(0.940)
  0.0030
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  0.9410 
(28.580)
***  1.2384
Large time deposit maturity  0.0232 
(25.440)
***  0.0875
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -0.0018 
(-2.920)
***  -0.0110
Over $10 bil dummy  -0.0001 
(-0.400)
  -0.0011
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.1410 
(18.110)
***  0.0428
National-bank dummy  -0.0570 
(-8.800)
***  -0.0205

























2  0.603 
Adjusted R
2  0.602 
Observations  68,809 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions of jumbo-CD yields on the above variables plus time 
and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 
1%(***) levels. 
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Table 4.  Regression Results: Deposit Growth Rates 
 
A.  Cluster-Selected Variables 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 
  Standardized 
Coefficient 
Net noninterest margin  -0.0301 
(-0.180) 
 -0.0009 
Delinquent loans / assets  0.0015 
(1.000) 
 0.0041 
Equity / assets  -0.0252 
(-0.720) 
 -0.0029 
CRE / loans  -0.0059 
(-0.600) 
 -0.0026 
ROA  -0.0510 
(-0.260) 
 -0.0012 
Log of total assets  0.0409 
(0.280) 
 0.0015 


















Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.0787 
(0.410) 
 0.0017 
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  -3.0100 
(-2.120) 
** -0.1493 
Large-CD maturity  0.2600 
(6.600) 
*** 0.0369 
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -0.0378 
(-1.410) 
 -0.0086 
Over $10 bil dummy  0.5190 
(0.320) 
 0.0014 
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.7220 
(2.140) 
** 0.0082 
National-bank dummy  -1.9120 
(-6.840) 
*** -0.0259 

























2  0.022 
Adjusted R
2  0.021 
Observations  68,809 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions of jumbo-CD growth rates on the above variables, 
selected through variable clustering, plus time and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Table 4 (continued).  Regression Results: Deposit Growth Rates 
 
B. SEER Variables 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 
  Standardized 
Coefficient 
ROA  -0.0667 
(-0.380)
  -0.0016
C&I Loans / assets  -0.0001 
(-0.310)
  -0.0014
Residential RE Loans / assets  -0.0059 
(-0.380)
  -0.0019
Jumbo CDs / assets  0.0077 
(0.360)
  0.0016
Equity / assets  0.0091 
(0.240)
  0.0010
Loans 90+ days past due / assets  0.2460 
(0.830)
  0.0034
Loans 30-89 days past due / assets  0.0711 
(0.450)
  0.0019
Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.0413 
(0.210)
  0.0009
Securities / assets  -0.0169 
(-1.440)
  -0.0070


















Log of total assets  0.0239 
(0.170)
  0.0009
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  -3.0210 
(-2.130)
**  -0.1499
Large time deposit maturity  0.2610 
(6.610)
***  0.0370
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -0.0379 
(-1.410)
  -0.0086
Over $10 bil dummy  0.0032 
(0.200)
  0.0009
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.7220 
(2.140)
**  0.0082
National-bank dummy  -1.9120 
(-6.840)
***  -0.0259

























2  0.023 
Adjusted R
2  0.021 
Observations  68,809 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions of jumbo-CD growth rates on the above variables 
plus time and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1%(***) levels.   21
Table 5.  Regression Results: CAMELS Composite Scores 
 
A.  Cluster-Selected Variables 
    OLS  Logit 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 






Net noninterest margin  0.0022 
(0.450)
 0.0034  0.077 
(12.033)
***
Delinquent loans / assets  0.1019 
(22.200)
*** 0.1444  0.389 
(421.304)
***
Equity / assets  -0.0286 
(-25.520)
*** -0.1648  -0.129 
(627.562)
***
CRE / loans  0.0015 
(4.890)
*** 0.0339  0.007 
(36.312)
***
ROA  -0.2480 
(-42.990)
*** -0.3199  -1.261 
(1,740.407)
***
Log of total assets  -0.0660 
(-14.560)
*** -0.1261  -0.241 
(166.808)
*** 
Loans / core deposits  0.0014 
(10.880)


















Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.2282 
(40.590)
*** 0.2649  0.879 
(1,160.615)
***
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  -0.0303 
(-0.680)
 -0.0762  -0.025 
(0.020)
Large-CD maturity  -0.0008 
(-0.680)
 -0.0060  -0.005 
(0.943)
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -0.0011 
(-1.310)
 -0.0127  -0.004 
(1.363)
Over $10 bil dummy  0.0149 
(0.310)
 0.0022  0.114 
(0.323)
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.0144 
(1.370)
 0.0084  0.030 
(0.497)
National-bank dummy  -0.0083 
(-0.950)
 -0.0057  -0.045 
(1.640)
State-member-bank dummy  -0.0660 
(-4.520)





















MSA dummy  0.0006 
(0.080)
 0.0005  -0.004 
(0.012)
R
2  0.373 
Adjusted R
2  0.370 
Observations  17,643 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS and logistic regressions of supervisor-assigned CAMELS composite ratings on the 
above variables, selected through variable clustering, plus time and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***) levels.   22
Table 5 (continued).  Regression Results: CAMELS Composite Scores 
 
B. SEER Variables 
    OLS  Logit 
    Coefficient 
(t statistic) 






ROA  -0.2330 
(-46.290) 
***  -0.3005 1.223 
(1,939.515)
*** 
C&I Loans / assets  0.0024 
(3.560) 
***  0.0251 -0.012 
(19.137)
*** 
Residential RE Loans / assets  -0.0013 
(-2.700) 
***  -0.0219 0.004 
(3.428)
* 
Jumbo CDs / assets  0.0075 
(11.710) 
***  0.0782 -0.030 
(127.163)
*** 
Tangible net worth / assets  -0.0282 
(-23.600) 
***  -0.1601 0.132 
(555.044)
*** 
Loans 90+ days past due / assets  0.0949 
(10.370) 
***  0.0663 -0.376 
(101.148)
*** 
Loans 30-89 days past due / assets  0.0763 
(16.040) 
***  0.1081 -0.305 
(237.713)
*** 
Nonaccruing loans / assets  0.2066 
(36.390) 
***  0.2399 -0.814 
(954.360)
*** 
Securities / assets  -0.0024 
(-6.530) 
***  -0.0496 0.009 
(35.441)
*** 
Other real estate owned / assets  0.1700 
(14.670) 


















Log of total assets  -0.0605 
(-14.290) 
***  -0.1156 0.233 
(172.482)
*** 
Maturity-weighted Treasury yield  -0.0137 
(-0.310) 
  -0.0344  -0.037 
(0.041)
 
Large-CD maturity  -0.0010 
(-0.800) 
  -0.0069  0.005 
(0.989)
 
Maturity-Treasury interactive term  -0.0010 
(-1.250) 
  -0.0119  0.003 
(0.980)
 
Over $10 bil dummy  0.0046 
(0.100) 
  0.0007  -0.041 
(0.045)
 
Brokered-deposit dummy  0.0194 
(1.870) 
**  0.0113  -0.057 
(1.806)
 
National-bank dummy  -0.0092 
(-1.070) 
  -0.0063  0.048 
(1.811)
 
State-member-bank dummy  -0.0637 
(-4.430) 





















MSA dummy  -0.0014 
(-0.180) 




2  0.392 
Adjusted R
2  0.389 
Observations  17,643 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS and logistic regressions of supervisor-assigned CAMELS composite ratings on the 
above variables, selected through variable clustering, plus time and state dummies (not reported).  Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***) levels. 
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Figure 1.  Hierarchical Variable Clustering of Risk Variables 
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